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Abstract 
Two experiments were conducted to investigate the influences on 4-8-year olds’ and adults’ 
moral judgments. In both, participants were told stories from previous studies that had 
indicated that children’s judgments are largely outcome-based. Building on recent research in 
which one change to these studies’ methods resulted in substantially more intention-based 
judgment, in Experiment 1 (N = 75) the salience and recency of intention information were 
increased, and in Experiment 2 (N = 99) carefulness information (i.e., the absence of 
negligence) was also added. In both experiments even the youngest children’s judgments were 
primarily intention-based, and in Experiment 2 punishment judgments were similar to adults’ 
from 5-6 years. Comparisons of data across studies and experiments indicated that both 
changes increased the proportion of intention-based punishment judgments – but not 
acceptability judgments – across age-groups. These findings challenge and help to explain 
those of much previous research, according to which children’s judgments are primarily 
outcome-based. However, younger participants continued to judge according to outcome more 
than older participants. This might indicate that young children are more influenced by 
outcomes than are adults, but other possible explanations are discussed. 
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The Development of Intention-Based Morality: The Influence of Intention Salience and 
Recency, Negligence, and Outcome on Children’s and Adults’ Judgments 
Intention-based moral judgment is a fundamental component of mature morality: adults 
typically judge actions according to whether they are well- or ill-intentioned. In contrast, 
researchers have repeatedly reported that young children base their moral judgments more on 
the outcomes of actions than on the intentions of the agents (e.g., Buchanan & Thompson, 
1973; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Elkind & Dabek, 1977; Farnill, 1974; 
Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Imamoğlu, 1975; Killen, Mulvey, 
Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Piaget, 1932/1965; Walden, 1982; Yuill, 1984; 
Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). However, there remains considerable debate about this issue, 
and several studies have reported that young children (e.g., Baird & Astington, 2004; Bearison 
& Isaacs, 1975; Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973; Nelson, 1980; Nobes, Panagiotaki, 
& Pawson, 2009; Nummedal & Bass, 1976; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010), and even 
8-month-olds (Hamlin, 2013), are influenced primarily by intentions. 
Rather than seeking to add to this already large body of often-conflicting evidence, 
perhaps the main objective of researchers in this field should be to investigate the relative 
validity of previous studies’ contrasting claims. Duncan, Engel, Claessens, and Dowsett (2014) 
argue that this should be done by testing the replicability and robustness of previous research. 
However, despite the scores of studies of children’s moral judgment since Piaget’s (1932 / 
1965) seminal work, this approach has been taken remarkably rarely. 
Two very similar studies that provide strong evidence for the claim that children judge 
primarily according to outcome are those of Helwig et al. (2001) and Zelazo et al. (1996). 
Children and adults were told stories about agents who accidentally made peers or pet animals 
happy or sad. The researchers reported that participants of all ages judged attempted harms (ill-
intentioned actions with positive outcomes) to be good, and accidental harms (well-intentioned 
actions with negative outcomes) to be bad; moreover, children – though not adults – considered 
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the well-intentioned agents to deserve punishment, and the ill-intentioned agents to deserve 
none. That is, regardless of age, almost all participants made outcome-based acceptability 
judgements, and children (the oldest were nearly 8) made primarily outcome-based punishment 
judgments.  
Nobes, Panagiotaki and Bartholomew (2016) replicated Helwig et al.’s and Zelazo et 
al.’s methods and corroborated their findings. However, when the wording of the acceptability 
question was changed from the original (e.g., “Is it okay for Kevin to give Rob a puppy?”)1 to 
being more agent-focused (e.g., “Is Kevin good, bad or just okay?”), the older children’s and 
adults’ responses were essentially reversed: they judged almost exclusively according to 
intentions. Moreover, despite Helwig et al.’s and Zelazo et al.’s other key question – whether 
the agent should be punished – remaining unchanged, punishment judgments also became 
substantially more intention-based. Even the youngest children’s (4-5 years) acceptability and 
punishment judgments were now based approximately equally on intention and outcome.  
Nobes et al. (2016) also asked participants who made outcome-based punishment 
judgments a “parental knowledge” question (e.g., “If her parents found out she tried to hit the 
dax, should they tell her off?”). The large majority now gave intention-based responses. This 
shows that even participants who give outcome-based judgments are usually aware of, and can 
base their judgments on, intentions. It also suggests that some – perhaps many – apparently 
outcome-based responses result from the belief that, since parents cannot know their children’s 
intentions, they tend to assume that a bad outcome is culpable and punishable because it was 
probably deliberate.  
These findings challenge both the robustness of Helwig et al.’s and Zelazo et al.’s 
findings and the validity of the claim that children’s judgments are primarily outcome-based. 
However, they are consistent with a “weak” version of this account: while children’s 
                                                          
1 Helwig et al. and Zelazo et al. asked about the acceptability of acts in this way because, as well as investigating 
the relative influence of intention and outcome on moral judgments, they sought to address the separate issue of 
whether children judge according to acts (e.g., petting or hitting an animal) or the harm that results from them. 
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judgments are not primarily outcome-based, there is still an “outcome-to-intent shift” 
(Cushman et al., 2013) because, with increasing age, individuals judge less according to 
outcome, and more according to intention. 
One explanation is that children’s judgments are indeed less intention-focused, and more 
outcome-focused, than adults’. Cushman and colleagues (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 
2013) have proposed a dual-process model that comprises an early-developing, relatively 
automatic process that is sensitive to the causes of outcomes, and a later-developing process 
that is sensitive to mental states, especially intentions. Until about 5 years of age children have 
only the first, causal, process available and so are influenced almost entirely by outcomes; they 
then gradually become able also to take intentions into account.  
An alternative explanation is that children are able to make intention-based moral 
judgments from an early age, but lack the cognitive resources (e.g., memory, executive 
functions, theory of mind) required to remember, understand and integrate intention 
information in their judgments, at least when told stories such as those of Helwig et al. and 
Zelazo et al. In particular, the salience of outcomes might be greater than that of intentions 
such that young children forget or fail to notice agents’ intentions, or are unable to inhibit their 
emotional or intuitive responses to the outcomes (e.g., Buon, Seara-Cardoso, & Viding, 2016; 
Margoni & Surian, 2016). This problem of outcomes being more salient than intentions is 
common in this area of research, not least because outcomes (e.g., a victim’s pleasure or pain; a 
desired gift or broken possession) are typically tangible and explicit, whereas intentions are 
less easily perceived and understood. Bearison and Isaacs (1975) and Nelson (1980) reported 
that children’s judgments became more intention-based when the intentions were stated 
explicitly, and hence were more salient than when they were implicit, as in Piaget’s (1932 / 
1965) stories. In addition, since intentions precede outcomes, they are almost invariably 
presented both verbally and pictorially in this order, and so recency effects are likely. Feldman, 
Klosson, Parsons, Rholes and Ruble (1976) and Nummedal and Bass (1976) found that 
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children’s judgments became more intention-based when they reversed the order of 
presentation from the usual intention then outcome, to outcome followed by intention. More 
recently, Gvozdic, Moutier, Dupoux and Buon (2016) reported that metacognitive training, and 
in particular the use of an executive alert (to “not focus too much” on the consequences), 
resulted in 5-8 year-old children making adult-like, primarily intention-based judgments. This 
finding supports a cognitive resources account because it indicates that children’s outcome-
based judgment arises not from an inability to understand and use intention information, but 
from failure to inhibit their focus on outcomes. 
A third possible explanation of the intention-to-outcome shift is that children are able to 
make intention-based moral judgments from an early age, but are influenced in their judgments 
by presumed negligence of the agents (Nuñez, Laurent, & Gray, 2014). For example, Helwig et 
al. told a story about Ethan, who wanted to make his friend happy by giving him a puppy. 
However, the shopkeeper made a mistake so that Ethan accidentally gave his friend a gift box 
containing a tarantula. Despite his good intentions, mature, intention-based judges might have 
considered Ethan blameworthy because he was careless not to check the present before giving 
it to his friend; that is, they might have judged him naughty and deserving of punishment not 
because of the outcome per se, but because he was negligent. Since negligence co-varies with 
outcome (a bad outcome implies carelessness), these mature judgments would appear to be 
outcome-based. Nobes et al. (2009) found that, when carefulness was explicitly stated, even 3-
4 year-olds judged primarily according to intention. 
The current study. In this study we tested these separate – though not entirely mutually 
exclusive – accounts by building on Nobes et al.’s (2016) replications of Helwig et al.’s (2001) 
and Zelazo et al.’s (1996) studies. Our objectives were to evaluate the claim that young 
children base their moral judgments on the outcomes of actions rather than on the agents’ 
intentions, and to investigate the reasons for their judgments.  
Two experiments were conducted, in each of which a single change was made to 
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systematically test its effects on moral judgments. Both experiments were near-replications of 
Helwig et al.’s and Zelazo et al.’s studies, except that the acceptability question was rephrased 
(as in Nobes et al., 2016), intention salience and recency were increased, and in Experiment 2 
carefulness (i.e., lack of negligence) information was added. Data from these experiments were 
then compared with those of Nobes et al. (2016) to determine the extent to which these factors 
separately and conjointly accounted for some children’s continued outcome-based judgments, 
and the increase with age of intention-based judgment, that were reported there. 
The approach of replicating studies that provided strong support for the view that 
children’s moral judgments are primarily outcome-based, and systematically manipulating one 
factor at a time, enabled us to identify whether, and to what extent, each factor influenced 
judgments. It ensured that different findings – in particular, of intention-based judgment – 
could not be attributed to any other methodological differences, such as variations in the 
content or presentation of stories. 
If it were found that children’s moral judgments became largely or wholly intention-
based when intention salience and recency were increased, or when carefulness (i.e., absence 
of negligence) information was added, this would provide strong support for the second 
(intention salience) or third (negligence) of the possible explanations outlined above. Since 
these factors have only rarely been investigated before – in the large majority of studies in this 
area outcomes have been more salient than intentions, and participants have been told nothing 
about carefulness or carelessness – these explanations would be directly applicable to most 
previous studies, too.  
On the other hand, if there were little or no increase in children’s use of intention 
information compared with that reported by Nobes et al. (2016), this would be consistent with 
accounts such as that of Cushman et al. (2013), that young children’s judgments are strongly 
influenced by outcome. 
Experiment 1 
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The first experiment investigated the impact on children’s and adults’ moral judgments 
of the relative salience and recency of intention and outcome information. The methods were 
almost identical to those of Helwig et al. and Zelazo et al., except that, as in Nobes et al. 
(2016), the acceptability question was changed to be more agent-focused than in the original 
studies. In addition, the salience and recency of intention information was increased.  
It was predicted that participants of all ages would judge more according to intention 
than outcome, that is, accidental harms (positive intentions, negative outcomes) would be 
considered more acceptable and less punishable than attempted harms (negative intentions, 
positive outcomes). In particular, we expected that younger children’s judgments would be 
primarily intention-based. We also expected that, when participants gave outcome-based 
responses, the majority would give intention-based responses to the parental knowledge 
question. 
Method 
Sample  
The participants were 19 children (12 girls) aged 4-5 years (M = 62.5; range = 58-65 
months), 24 (12 girls) aged 5-6 years (M = 74.0; range = 66-82 months); 20 (10 girls) aged 7-8 
years (M = 97.1; range = 88-104 months), and 12 adults (5 women) (M = 42 years, range = 18–
70 years2). The children attended five British state primary and junior schools. The adults were 
mainly university students and administrative staff. All participants were white except for five 
African Caribbeans and five South Asians. Children were excluded when parental consent was 
not given, on teachers’ advice (e.g., because children were very shy, or their English was poor), 
or when children showed signs of boredom or distraction. Two of the youngest children 
withdrew early. 
Nobes et al. (2016) indicated effect sizes of action valence (accidental or attempted 
                                                          
2 In both experiments reported here there was no indication that adults’ judgments changed 
with age, rs < .10 in magnitude, ps > .74. 
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harm) when the rephrased acceptability question was asked (as in the present study) of p2 
= .452 for acceptability (naughtiness) judgments, and p2 = .185 for punishment judgments. An 
a priori power analysis using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with effect 
size specification as in Cohen (1988), indicated that a sample of 40 participants (i.e., 10 per age 
group) would be sufficient to detect the smaller effect (for punishment) with power (1 - β) set 
at 0.80 and α = .05.  
Design 
The independent variables were age group, action valence and source of story (Helwig et 
al. or Zelazo et al.) The dependent variables were acceptability (naughtiness) and punishment 
judgments, justifications, and “parental knowledge” judgments.  
Measures  
Each participant was told two illustrated stories from Helwig et al. (2001) and two from 
Zelazo et al. (1996) (Appendix). Each of these pairs comprised one accidental harm (positive 
intention, negative outcome) and one attempted harm (negative intention, positive outcome). In 
Helwig et al.’s accidental harm, Ethan had the good intention of giving his friend a puppy, but 
the shopkeeper put a big spider in the gift box by mistake, so Ethan made his friend scared and 
upset. In the attempted harm, ill-intentioned Chris wanted to give a big spider, but – because of 
the same less-than-fastidious shopkeeper – accidentally gave a puppy. Zelazo et al.’s accidental 
harm involved Sally, who wanted to make her pet (a “dax”) happy by stroking it, but the dax 
jumped up so that Sally accidentally hit it and made it sad. In the attempted harm, Anne also 
had a dax which she wanted to hurt, but the dax wiggled away so Anne accidentally stroked it, 
making it happy.  
During each story, participants were asked to predict the agents’ behavior (e.g., “What is 
Ethan going to get Chris for his birthday?”), and, in the Helwig et al. stories, they were also 
asked to predict the recipient’s emotions (e.g., “How do you think Chris felt when he got the 
big spider?”) After each story, participants were asked to make two judgments, one about 
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acceptability (goodness or badness), and the other about the level of punishment that the agent 
deserved. 
These methods were in all relevant respects identical to those used in the original studies 
(and shown by Nobes et al. (2016) to closely replicate their findings), except for two sets of 
changes: those made by Nobes et al., and those made for this experiment.  
The changes made by Nobes et al. to the original studies were as follows: the 
acceptability questions were rephrased so that they focused on whether the agent was good or 
bad (e.g., “Is Sally good, bad or just okay? How good / bad?”); character information (e.g., 
“Sally is nice. She doesn’t want to hurt anyone”) was removed because it gave the answer to 
the rephrased intention question3; participants were asked to justify their punishment 
judgments; and, when they gave apparently outcome-based judgments, they were asked a 
“parental knowledge” question, e.g., “If her parents found out she tried to hit the dax, should 
they tell her off?” The justification and parental knowledge questions were asked after the 
judgments to ensure that they did not influence the judgments. In addition, some words were 
changed to improve comprehension by our British participants, for example, Anne “stroked” 
the dax rather than petted it; and Ethan accidentally gave a “big spider” rather than a tarantula. 
The following additional changes were made for this experiment: First, three 
confirmation questions were added directly before the judgment questions. They concerned the 
outcome (e.g., “Did Sally hit the dax or stroke it?”), cause (e.g., “Why did Sally hit the dax? 
Did she want to stroke the dax, or did she stroke it by mistake?”), and intention (“What did 
Sally try to do? Did she try to stroke the dax, or did she try to hit it?”). Wrong responses were 
corrected by the interviewers. These questions were included to ensure that the key elements of 
the stories had been understood and remembered (this was not assessed in the original studies), 
                                                          
3 Removal of character information would be expected to reduce intention-based judgment 
relative to the original studies because it implied the agents’ intentions (e.g., Anne was nasty, 
so she wanted to hurt the dax). 
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and the second and third of these questions were also designed to increase the salience and 
recency of intention information relative to those of outcome information.  
Second, another post-judgment question was asked in this experiment: participants who 
gave apparently outcome-based judgments (e.g., to punish a well-intentioned agent) were asked 
again about the agents’ intentions (e.g., “What did Sally want to do the dax? Did she want to 
make it feel nice or did she want to hurt it?”) This question was included to assess whether 
apparently outcome-based judgments occurred because participants had forgotten about the 
agents’ intentions. 
The third change made in this experiment was to exclude the comprehension and 
confirmation questions that were asked in the original studies. These referred to aspects of the 
stories that were unrelated to intentions, causes or outcomes and instead asked whether the dax 
in Zelazo et al. liked being petted or hit, or if the boys in Helwig et al. liked puppies or 
tarantulas. Since Nobes et al. (2016) reported that 98.5% of children’s answers to these 
questions were correct, and Zelazo et al. approximately 96%, they were considered 
unnecessary and excluded to avoid the interviews becoming too long.  
To summarize, the only relevant change from Nobes et al., (2016) was that the 
confirmation questions about cause and intention were added. As in Nobes et al., the 
acceptability question was rephrased so that it focused on the agent rather than the outcome, 
and character information was removed. All other changes were neutral because they 
concerned questions that were excluded because they were about irrelevant aspects of the 
stories, or that occurred after the judgments. 
As in the original studies, acceptability judgments were scored from 1 (really, really 
bad), through 3 (okay), to 5 (really, really good), and punishment from 0 (no trouble), through 
1 (a little trouble), to 2 (a lot of trouble). For example, responses that Sally (who was well-
intentioned but who accidentally hurt her pet) is good and should not be punished would 
indicate intention-based judgment, whereas saying that Anne (who was ill-intentioned but who 
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accidentally made her pet happy) is good and should not be punished would indicate outcome-
based judgment.  
Justifications were coded according to whether they were based on intentions (e.g., 
“Because she wanted to smack it”, “He didn’t mean to, it was an accident”), outcomes (e.g., 
“Cos he gived a big horrid spider”, “The animal was sad and cried”), negligence (“He should 
have checked inside the box”, “She didn’t hold on tight enough”), or other (e.g. “Cos she looks 
like my friend”; “Don’t know”). Justifications were also coded according to whether they were 
factually correct. For example, if a participant said that Sally (who was well-intentioned) 
should be punished “Because she tried to hurt the dax”, their justification would be coded as 
intention-based, but factually incorrect. A quarter of all justifications were coded by a second 
independent judge, and interrater reliability was 94.7% (Cohen’s κ = .91). 
Pictures were 20cm x 30cm sketches that illustrated the story characters, their intentions 
(e.g., the agent with, in a thought bubble, his smiling friend), likes and dislikes (e.g., the 
smiling friend with a puppy), causes (e.g., a shopkeeper places a big spider, instead of a puppy, 
in a gift box), and outcomes (e.g., the friend looking unhappy with a big spider). The Zelazo et 
al. pictures were kindly provided by the authors, but the Helwig et al. pictures are no longer 
available and so were redrawn according to the story texts, in the same style as the Zelazo et al. 
pictures.   
Procedure  
Participants were interviewed individually in quiet areas of their schools or university. 
They were first given an introduction and brief explanation, and then asked if they were happy 
to continue. The four stories were told in random order, except that either the pair from Helwig 
et al., or the pair from Zelazo et al., was told first. 
Results 
 Comprehension. The percentages of correct responses to the prediction, confirmation 
and justification questions, and to the pre- and post-judgment confirmation questions, are 
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shown in Table 1. Of the 4-5- and 5-6 year-old children, 60.0% and 55.6% respectively gave 
one or more incorrect responses to the 12 (i.e., 3 for each of the 4 stories) confirmation 
questions that they were asked, and 48.0% and 22.2% gave 2 or more incorrect responses. All 
of the older children and adults answered all of these questions correctly.  
 Acceptability judgments. Preliminary analyses revealed no main or interaction effects 
of gender or of source of story (Zelazo et al. or Helwig et al.) and so these were excluded from 
further analyses. A 4 (Age group) x 2 (Action valence [accidental harm, attempted harm]) 
mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on action valence indicated a main effect of action 
valence on acceptability judgments, F(1,69) = 125.67, p < .001, p2 = .65 (Figure 1). 
Participants rated well-intentioned actions with bad outcomes more acceptable than ill-
intentioned actions with good outcomes, that is, their acceptability judgments were more 
intention- than outcome-based. This was qualified by an interaction between action valence 
and age group, F(3,69) = 13.71, p<.001, p2 =.37. Pairwise comparisons indicated that adults 
made this distinction more clearly than all three child age groups (ps < .001), and 7-8 year olds 
more clearly than 5-6-year olds p = .03. Participants of all four age groups rated accidental 
harms more acceptable than attempted harms, Fs ≥ 8.0, ps ≤ .02, p2s ≥ .28. The main effect of 
age-group did not approach significance.  
 Punishment judgments. The equivalent analyses were conducted on punishment ratings 
(Figure 2). Source of story and gender were again excluded following preliminary analyses. 
The mixed ANOVA showed a main effect of action valence, F(1,69) = 56.82, p < .001, p2 
= .45, indicating that well-intentioned actions were judged less punishable than ill-intentioned 
actions. There was also an interaction between action valence and age-group, F(3,69) = 3.86, p 
= .013, p2 = .14. Pairwise comparisons indicated that adults distinguished action valences 
more clearly than the 4-5-year-olds and 5-6 year-olds, ps < .01, and marginally more clearly 
than 7-8-year-olds, p < .07. All three older age-groups considered accidental harms less 
punishable than attempted harms, Fs > 5.9, ps < .03, p2s > .20, and 4-5-year-olds judged them 
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marginally less punishable, F(1,18) = 3.77, p = .07, p2 = .18. The main effect of age-group did 
not approach significance.  
Justifications. Table 2 shows the percentages of participants’ justifications of their 
punishment judgments that were based on intention, negligence and outcome. From 5-6 years 
justifications were significantly more intention- than outcome-based (binomial ps < .01). 
Adults’ justifications were based on intention rather than outcome more than were those of any 
of the child age-groups’, 
2
(1)s > 6.9, ps < .01.  
Parental knowledge. When outcome-based punishment judgments were made (i.e., an 
accidental harm-doer should be punished, or an attempted harm-doer should not), participants 
were asked whether the agent’s parents should punish if they knew the agent’s intentions.  
Table 3 shows the frequencies of outcome-based punishment judgments and of intention-based 
responses to the parental knowledge question (i.e., they should not punish an accidental harm-
doer, or they should punish an attempted harm-doer). 
Discussion 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, participants’ acceptability and punishment 
judgments were primarily intention-based: even the youngest children considered accidental 
harms significantly more acceptable, and marginally more punishable, than the attempted 
harms. However, there was a substantial effect of age: older participants’ judgments were 
considerably more intention-based than younger participants’.  
The second hypothesis was also supported: when participants made outcome-based 
punishment judgments, the majority at all ages gave intention-based responses to the parental 
knowledge question.  
Responses to the confirmation questions indicated that approximately 10% of each of the 
key aspects of the stories – intention, cause and outcome – were initially misunderstood by 4-
6-year-olds. This suggests that, since these questions were not asked in the original or previous 
studies – nor, of course, wrong answers corrected – approximately 20% of young children’s 
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judgments in those studies were based on incorrect information. This would have led children 
who actually made intention-based judgments, but misunderstood agents’ intentions, to make 
apparently outcome-based judgments. Equally, children who made outcome-based judgments, 
but misunderstood the outcomes, would have made apparently intention-based responses. 
Responses to the post-judgment intention questions indicated that approximately a 
quarter of the youngest children’s apparently outcome-based responses, and 10% of the 5-6-
year olds’, are likely to have been based on misinterpreted or forgotten intention. That is, when 
these children said that a well-intentioned agent was naughty and punishable, their judgments 
could actually have been based on the misunderstood or misremembered intentions of the 
agents.  
These findings indicate that the combination of the rephrased acceptability question and 
increased salience and recency of intention information accounts for almost all of the outcome-
based judgment by older participants that was reported by Helwig et al. and Zelazo et al. It also 
explains most of young children’s outcome-based judgment, but not all: there was still a strong 
effect of age, in that older children’s and adults’ judgments were more intention-based than 
young children’s. The possibility that this might be due to younger participants assuming that 
accidental harms were caused by negligence was investigated in Experiment 2.   
Experiment 2 
This experiment built on Experiment 1 to investigate whether the outcome-based 
judgments reported there and in Nobes et al. (2016) resulted from assumptions – particularly 
by young children – that accidental harms were caused by negligence. If so, despite their being 
well-intentioned, these actions would be considered blameworthy and punishable. Since 
negligence co-varies with outcome, the result would be that mature, negligence-based moral 
judgments would appear to be immature, outcome-based judgments.  
This possibility was tested by replicating Experiment 1 and adding information about 
carefulness, that is, the absence of negligence. This information was inserted into each story by 
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explicitly stating that agents were careful, and by explaining how they were careful. In 
addition, pictures were added in which the agents were shown being careful. If the negligence 
account is correct, inclusion of this verbal and pictorial information should decrease the 
frequency of apparently outcome-based (but actually negligence-based) judgments of 
accidental harms.  
The same carefulness information was added to the attempted harms. Its inclusion might 
lead to harsher (i.e., more intention-based) judgments since being careful about causing harm 
could emphasize the agent’s malice; on the other hand, participants might consider carefulness 
to be praiseworthy, regardless of ill-intention, in which case judgments would be less harsh, 
i.e., apparently more outcome-based.   
The first prediction was that, as in Nobes et al. (2016) and Experiment 1, acceptability 
and punishment judgments would be primarily intention-based. Second, we predicted that, as 
in Experiment 1, even 4-5 year olds’ judgments would be based more on intention than 
outcome. If young children’s tendency to judge more than adults according to outcome resulted 
largely or wholly from their judgments being negligence-based (i.e., they assumed that bad 
outcomes resulted from negligence, and judged accordingly), then the addition of carefulness 
information should result in the differences between younger and older participants’ judgments 
and justifications largely or wholly disappearing.   
The third prediction was that the inclusion of carefulness information in this experiment 
would draw participants’ attention to the issue of negligence, and therefore increase the 
frequency of references to negligence when justifying their judgments. 
And fourth, intention-based responses would be elicited from the parental knowledge 
question, despite its being asked only when punishment judgments were outcome-based.  
Sample. The participants were 26 children aged 4-5 years (12 girls, M = 61.40; range = 
56-65 months), 35 aged 5-6 years (19 girls, M = 75.31, range = 66-82 months), 20 aged 7-8 
years (10 girls, M = 99.8, range = 94-106 months) and 18 adults (10 women, M = 28, range = 
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18-54 years). The children attended six British state primary and junior schools in rural and 
urban areas. Thirteen 4-6 year-olds withdrew early. 
An a priori power analysis indicated that a sample of 20 (i.e., 5 per age-group) would be 
sufficient to detect the effect of action valence with effect size set at p2 = .45 (as in 
Experiment 1 for punishment judgments) and power at .95. 
Design, measures and procedure. All methods were identical to those of Experiment 1, 
- including both the agent-focused acceptability question used there and in Nobes et al. (2016), 
and increased salience and recency of intention information – except that carefulness (i.e., lack 
of negligence) information was added (Appendix, last column). This was done by explicitly 
stating that the agent was careful, and explaining how they were careful. For example, Sally, 
who wanted to make her pet happy by stroking it, “held it very carefully to make sure she 
didn’t hurt it”. In addition, another confirmation question was added (e.g., “Did Sally hold the 
dax carefully to make sure she didn’t hurt it?”) before the outcome, cause and intention 
confirmation questions. This was done to assess understanding and awareness of the 
negligence information; to ensure that children understood that the agent was careful – 
incorrect responses were corrected; and to increase the likelihood of participants remembering 
this information. Finally, another picture was added to each story between those showing the 
intentions and outcomes in which, for example, Sally held the pet carefully on a table with two 
hands.  
A second independent judge coded 25% of the justifications, and interrater reliability was 
92.9% (Cohen’s κ = .87). 
Results 
Comprehension. The percentages of correct predictions, confirmations and judgment 
justifications are shown in Table 4. Despite being told explicitly that the agents were careful, 
large proportions of children, and even 10% of adults, considered them to be careless. This was 
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especially the case regarding Helwig et al.’s characters, who were considered by 53.1% (4-5 
years), 49.1% (5-6 years) and 37.5% (7-8 years) of children to have been careless to give the 
wrong present.  
Of the 4-5, 5-6, and 7-8 year-old children, 46.7%, 12.9% and 35.0%, respectively, gave 
one or more incorrect responses to the 12 (i.e., 3 for each of the 4 stories) outcome, cause and 
intention confirmation questions that they were asked. 30.0% of 4-5-year-olds, 3.2% of 5-6-
year-olds, and 10.0% of the 7-8-year-olds gave 2 or more incorrect responses. All of the adults 
answered all of these questions correctly. 
Acceptability judgments. Gender and source of story were excluded following 
preliminary analysis. A 4 (Age group) x 2 (Action valence) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on action valence indicated that the well-intentioned accidental harms were judged 
more acceptable than the ill-intentioned attempted harms, F(1,82) = 221.86, p < .001, p2 = .70 
(Figure 3). This was qualified by an interaction between action valence and age group, F(3,82) 
= 17.96, p < .001, p2 =.36. Pairwise comparisons indicated that adults distinguished between 
accidental and attempted harms more clearly than all three child age-groups (ps < .001), and 
the youngest children did so less clearly than the 5-6-year-olds, p < .02, and 7-8-year-olds, p 
< .05. Participants of all age groups considered accidental harms significantly more acceptable 
than attempted harms, Fs ≥ 7.82, ps ≤ .012, p2 s ≥ .29. The main effect of age-group did not 
approach significance.  
Punishment judgments. The equivalent analysis of punishment ratings (Figure 4) also 
showed a main effect of action valence, F(1,77) = 91.24, p < .001, p2 = .54, and a marginally 
significant interaction between action valence and age-group, F(3,77) = 2.55, p = .06, p2 = .09. 
Pairwise comparisons indicated that the 4-5 year-olds distinguished between accidental and 
attempted harms less clearly than the 5-6 year-olds, p = .04, and adults, p = .01.  Accidental 
harms were considered less punishable than attempted harms by all four age-groups, F ≥ 7.95, 
ps ≤ .011, p2s ≥ .31. The main effect of age-group did not approach significance.  
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Justifications. The 4-5-year-olds’ (binomial p = .052) and all three other age-groups’ (ps 
< .01) justifications were based more on intention than on outcome (Table 5). This distinction 
was smaller for the 4-5-year-olds than for the other age groups, 
2
(1)s ≥ 7.7, ps < .01. 
Parental knowledge. Participants gave a total of 85 outcome-based punishment 
judgments, of which 65 (76.5%) were changed to intention-based in response to the parental 
knowledge question (Table 6). This proportion was similar for all age-groups (4-5 years: 
68.4%; adults: 88.8%). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 except that participants were told explicitly that 
agents were careful, shown additional pictures of them being careful, and then asked an extra 
question about whether the agents were careful. When this question was answered incorrectly, 
participants were reminded that the agents were careful. 
The first prediction – that acceptability and punishment judgments would be primarily 
intention-based – was supported. The second prediction was also supported: the 4-5 year-olds 
considered accidental harms more acceptable and less punishable than attempted harms. 
Moreover, from 5-6 years, children’s punishment judgments were based as much on intention 
as were adults’. However, there remained substantial differences between the age-groups’ 
acceptability judgments, with adults’ being more intention-based than all three children’s age-
groups’. Together, these findings replicate those of Experiment 1, and also suggest that telling 
children that agents are careful leads to increases in intention-based punishment judgment.  
The third prediction, concerning justifications, was not supported. The proportion of 
justifications that referred to negligence remained very low in this experiment, despite 
carefulness being stated explicitly. It is possible that, since participants were corrected when 
they gave the wrong answer to the carefulness confirmation question, nearly all considered the 
agents to be careful when they made their judgments, and so did not consider negligence to be 
relevant to their judgments. An alternative explanation is that, even when negligence influences 
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judgments, this influence is rarely made explicit in the justifications of these judgments.  
Responses to the parental knowledge question corroborated the findings of Nobes et al. 
(2016) and Experiment 1: at all ages a large majority of apparently outcome-based judgments 
were changed to intention-based responses when participants were informed that parents knew 
of the agents’ intentions. The fourth prediction was therefore supported. 
Despite having just been told that the agents were careful, about a third of the 4-6-year-
olds’ responses to the care confirmation question were that the agents were careless. Since this 
question has not been asked in previous studies it is not possible to know whether their 
participants also considered agents to be negligent, but it seems likely that they did, especially 
as, with very few exceptions (e.g., Nobes et al., 2009; Schleifer, Shultz, & Lefebvre-Pinard, 
1983; Shultz, Wright & Schleifer, 1986), participants were not told that agents were careful. 
That is, in the absence of carefulness information, it seems likely that participants were even 
more likely to assume that the agents were negligent. However, it is also possible that the 
explicit statement and depiction of carefulness merely drew the agents’ attention to the agents’ 
negligence but, for some reason (e.g., young children’s inability to inhibit intuitive responses), 
this did not lead them to consider them to be careful. 
The findings that children were considerably more likely to consider the Helwig et al. 
agents (who gave gift boxes containing the wrong animals) to be careless than the Zelazo et al. 
agents (who accidentally stroked or hit their pets), and that the source of story (Helwig et al. 
and Zelazo et al.) was not associated with judgments together indicate that perceived extra 
carelessness does not influence moral judgments. This would seem to be inconsistent with the 
negligence account, but respondents who said the agents were careless were corrected before 
they made their judgments, and it is possible that many were persuaded that agents were 
careful, after all.  
Considered individually, the findings of these experiments cannot reveal the separate and 
combined influence of the two changes – increasing the salience and recency of intention 
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information, and adding carefulness information – on moral judgments. To do so, it is 
necessary to compare judgments when neither, one, and both of these changes were made. 
These comparisons were made in the next stage of this study. 
Comparison of data between studies and experiments 
To investigate the influence of increasing the salience and recency of intention 
information, the findings of Experiment 1 were compared with those of Nobes et al. (2016). 
These experiments were identical except that different participants were tested, and in 
Experiment 1 intention information was more salient and recent.  
The influence of carefulness (i.e., the absence of negligence) on moral judgments was 
investigated by comparing the findings of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2. Apart 
from other participants being tested, these differed only in that in Experiment 2 participants 
were told explicitly that, and how, the agents were careful, that is, they were not negligent. 
By comparing the findings of Experiment 2 with those of Nobes et al. (2016) we also 
investigated the influence of the combination of more salient and recent intention and inclusion 
of carefulness information.  
Measures of the relative extent to which each participant in each of the three experiments 
judged according to intention or outcome – the difference scores – were obtained by 
calculating, separately for acceptability and punishment, the difference between their mean 
ratings of accidental and attempted harms. ANOVAs were run on the data as above except that 
experiment was included as an additional factor. Higher difference scores indicated more 
intention-based judgment.  
Results 
Acceptability judgments. Figure 5 shows the mean acceptability difference scores 
(accidental harm scores minus attempted harm scores) in the three experiments. A 3 (Age-
group) x 2 (Action valence [accidental harm, attempted harm]) x 3 (Experiment [Nobes et al., 
2016, Experiment 1, Experiment 2]) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on action valence 
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indicated a main effect of action valence on acceptability judgments, F(1,298) = 343.08, 
p<.001, p2 = .54, and a main effect of age-group, F(3,298) = 2.77, p = .04: the youngest 
children’s judgements were slightly harsher than those of the other three age-groups’, ps < .04. 
There was also an interaction between action valence and age-group, F(3,298) = 31.15, p<.001, 
p2 = .24. Participants of all four age-groups rated the well-intentioned accidental harms more 
acceptable than ill-intentioned attempted harms, Fs ≥ 9.41, ps ≤ .003, p2s > .10. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that adults made this distinction more clearly than all age-groups of 
children, ps < .001; the 7-8-year-olds more clearly than the 5-6-year-olds, p = .03, and the 4-5-
year-olds, p < .001; and the 5-6-year-olds marginally more clearly than the 4-5-year-olds, p 
= .06. There were no main or interaction effects of experiment. This was also the case when 
accidental and attempted harms were analysed separately. 
A post hoc power analysis was conducted to test whether the non-significant effect of 
experiment could be attributed to a lack of statistical power. This indicated that, with power (1 
– β) set at 0.80, α = .05, 2-tailed, and observed p2 = .003, would have required more than 10 
times the sample size (N = 3205) across all three experiments to reach statistical significance. It 
is therefore very unlikely that this null result resulted from limited sample size.  
Punishment judgments. The mean punishment difference scores (attempted harm scores 
minus accidental harm scores) for the three experiments are shown in Figure 6. The equivalent 
ANOVA as for acceptability ratings was run on punishment ratings and showed a main effect 
of action valence, F(1,298) = 153.31, p < .001, p2 = .34. There was also an interaction between 
action valence and age-group, F(3,298) = 10.48, p < .001, p2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that adults distinguished more clearly than all three age groups of children, ps ≤ .005, 
and the 4-5-year-olds less clearly than all three older age-groups ps ≤ .02). All three older age-
groups – but not the youngest group – judged accidental harms less punishable than attempted 
harms, Fs ≥ 21.48, ps < .001, p2s > .20. There was also an interaction between action valence 
and experiment, F(2, 298) = 9.84, p < .001, p2 = .06. Participants in Experiment 2 (mean 
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difference score = .78) distinguished between accidental harms and attempted harms 
marginally more clearly than did participants in Experiment 1, M = .58, p = .107, and 
significantly more than those in Nobes et al. (2016), M = .33, p < .001, and this distinction was 
made more clearly in Experiment 1 than in Nobes et al. (2016), p = .022. The main effects of 
age-group and experiment, the interaction between them, and their 3-way interaction with 
action valence, did not approach significance. 
Separate analyses showed that punishment judgments of both accidental harms, F(3, 308) 
= 3.14, p = .045, p2 = .02, and attempted harms,  F(3, 306) = 5.34, p = .005, p2 = .034,  
differed according to experiment. Pairwise comparisons indicated that, compared with Nobes 
et al. (2016), participants in Experiment 2 judged accidental harms to be less punishable, p 
= .013, and attempted harms to be more punishable, p = .002. In addition, attempted harms 
were considered marginally more punishable in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, p = .06. 
Discussion 
Comparison of data between studies indicated that increasing the salience and recency of 
intention information resulted in punishment judgments, but not acceptability judgments, being 
more intention-based. The absence of an interaction between experiment and age-group 
indicates that this effect was general to all age-groups, although, while in Nobes et al. (2016) 
the youngest children’s acceptability and punishment judgments were approximately equally 
intention- and outcome-based, in Experiment 1 these children’s judgments were based more on 
intention than on outcome.  
Comparisons between the experiments reported here indicated that, although adding 
carefulness information did not influence acceptability judgments, punishment judgments were 
marginally more intention-based in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.  
The combination of increased intention salience and added carefulness information 
resulted in punishment judgments, but not acceptability judgments, being more intention-based 
in Experiment 3 than in Nobes et al. (2016). Comparisons of mean difference scores suggests 
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that both changes contributed approximately equally to the increase in intention-based 
judgment.  
General discussion 
Two experiments were conducted to examine possible reasons for children’s and adults’ 
apparently outcome-based moral judgments. Participants were told four stories from two 
studies (Helwig et al., 2001; Zelazo et al., 1996), both of which strongly supported the claim 
that children’s moral judgments are primarily outcome-based. Nobes et al. (2016) replicated 
these studies, and found that changing the wording of the acceptability question resulted in 
substantially more intention-based judgment at all ages. However, some judgments were still 
based on outcomes: in particular, young children persisted in judging approximately as much 
according to outcome as to intention. The present study investigated possible reasons for this 
persisting outcome-based judgment with the aim of helping to explain the findings not only of 
the original studies, but also those of the many other studies in this area that have used similar 
methods and reported primarily outcome-based judgment by children.  
In the first experiment, the Nobes et al. study was replicated except that the salience and 
recency of intention information were increased by asking – and if necessary correcting – 
participants about agents’ intentions directly before they judged the agents. When participants’ 
awareness and understanding of the agents’ intentions was raised in this way, they judged 
accidental harms (positive intentions, negative outcomes) to be more acceptable and less 
punishable than attempted harms (negative intention, positive outcome): that is, they judged 
primarily according to intention. Even the youngest children’s (4-5 years) acceptability 
judgments were based significantly, and punishment judgments marginally, more on intentions 
than outcomes. However, many of the younger children continued to judge according to 
outcomes, and there remained a marked increase with age in the extent to which both types of 
judgment were intention-based. 
The second experiment investigated whether some or all of this still-persisting outcome-
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based judgment could be attributed to participants assuming that well-intentioned agents who 
accidentally caused harm were blameworthy because they were negligent, rather than because 
of the outcome per se. Experiment 1 was replicated except that participants were also told that, 
and how, agents were careful, that is, they were not negligent. The results of Experiment 1 
were replicated, except that the 4-5-year-olds’ punishment judgments (as well as their 
acceptability judgments) were based significantly more on intentions than on outcomes. 
Moreover, from 5-6 years children’s punishment judgments were as intention-based as were 
adults’. However, many of the 4-5 year-olds’ judgments, and even some of the older children’s 
acceptability judgments, remained based on outcome rather than intention.  
Data from the two experiments were then pooled with those from Nobes et al. (2016) to 
investigate the independent and combined influences of, first, increasing the salience and 
recency of intention information (by comparing the results of Nobes et al. with those of 
Experiment 1); second, adding carefulness information (by comparing data from Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2); and, third, both these changes (by comparing data from Nobes et al. with 
Experiment 2). 
Regarding acceptability judgments, there were no differences at any age between the 
three experiments. Although this indicates that neither factor (intention salience and 
negligence) has a discernible impact on acceptability judgments, in Experiments 1 and 2 (but 
not Nobes et al., 2016) even 4-5 year-olds considered accidental harms to be more acceptable 
than attempted harms, that is, they based these judgments more on intention than on outcome. 
This suggests that the effect of increasing the salience of intention information was large 
enough to raise young children’s judgments “above the bar” of intention-based acceptability 
judgment (i.e., they judged accidental harms significantly more acceptable than attempted 
harms), but was too small to reach significance when studies were compared.  
In contrast, punishment judgments were more intention-based when intentions were more 
salient and recent, and still more intention-based when negligence information was added. The 
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combination of these changes resulted in 4-5 year-olds’ punishment judgments being based 
significantly more on intentions than on outcomes, and 5-8 year-old’s punishment judgments 
being as intention-based as were adults’.  
The picture that emerges from these experiments is that acceptability judgments are 
hardly influenced, if at all, by either of the two factors investigated here. In contrast, both 
changes resulted in more intention-based punishment judgments, and the combination of both 
resulted in substantially more intention-based punishment judgments. Surprisingly, the changes 
were equally influential across age-groups, suggesting that the increase with age in intention-
based punishment judgment is not attributable to youngsters being more influenced by the 
salience of outcome information, or by assumptions of negligence, than older participants. 
Rather, participants at all ages were equally likely to be influenced by these factors.   
These factors therefore explain many outcome-based punishment judgments. However, 
they do not refute the “weak” form of the outcome-to-intent shift discussed above, according to 
which, although children’s judgments are not primarily influenced by outcomes, they are more 
inclined to judge according to outcome than are adults.  To this limited extent, then, the 
findings of this study are consistent with accounts of moral development such as Piaget’s 
(1932 / 1965) and Cushman et al.’s (2013), according to which children’s moral judgments are 
fundamentally different from adults’.  
However, the data reported here suggest other possible reasons for some, and possibly 
all, of the outcome-based judgment by children that persisted even in Experiment 2. First, some 
young children misunderstood or forgot the agents’ intentions so that their apparently outcome-
based judgments might actually have been based on misinterpreted intentions. In particular, 
despite having been reminded of, and if necessary corrected on, the agents’ intentions directly 
before the judgments, in Experiment 1 about a quarter of 4-5 year-olds and 10% of 5-6 year-
olds who gave outcome-based punishment judgments said directly afterwards that the well-
intentioned agents were ill-intentioned, or vice versa. Moreover, in Experiment 2 
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approximately a third of children considered the agents negligent, despite having just been told 
that they were careful. It is likely that many of these children based their judgments on 
misinterpretations of agents’ intentions, or assumptions that the agents were negligent, and 
therefore punishable. The implication is that their intention- or negligence-based responses 
would have given the impression that their judgments were outcome-based. These factors are 
even more likely to have influenced judgments in previous studies (including Helwig et al., 
Zelazo et al., and Nobes et al., 2016) since the relevant confirmation questions were not asked 
and, of course, erroneous responses were not corrected.  
A second possible reason for the remaining outcome-based responses was revealed by 
the parental knowledge question. When participants made outcome-based judgments, the 
majority in all age-groups gave intention-based responses to the parental knowledge question. 
This suggests that many outcome-based judgments occur because participants assume that 
punishers did not know about the agents’ intentions. Indeed, in reality parents and other 
authorities often do not know what was intended, and so can only infer intentions – rightly or 
wrongly – from the outcomes of actions. If this interpretation is correct, it indicates that even 
the findings of this experiment substantially underestimate the true incidence of intention-
based reasoning. However, this finding must be treated with caution because the reason why 
parental knowledge questions elicit intention-based responses might be that they remind the 
participants of agents’ intentions, or emphasize their importance. But whatever its explanation, 
this finding shows that even those participants who make outcome-based judgments are 
sensitive to intentions, and are able to judge according to them.   
The unexpected finding that acceptability judgments were not influenced by either factor, 
while punishment judgments were influenced by both, suggests that these two forms of 
judgment are affected by different factors and are driven by different processes. Cushman et al. 
(2013) have proposed that punishment judgments are influenced by both the early-developing 
causal process and the later-developing mental-state process, while acceptability judgments are 
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influenced only by the latter. They would therefore predict that acceptability judgments 
become intention-based earlier in development than punishment judgments, but our findings 
indicate the opposite.  
However, a possible reason for negligence information influencing punishment – but not 
acceptability – judgments might be that punishment judgments are associated with perceptions 
of causality, as Cushman and colleagues suggest. When participants are told that agents were 
careful, this might attenuate their assumption that accidental harm-doers caused the accident, 
which would reduce their tendency to consider them punishable; conversely, it might reinforce 
their view that attempted harm-doers are responsible, in which case these agents would be 
deemed more punishable. The result would be as observed, namely that punishment judgments, 
but not acceptability judgments, become more intention-based when negligence information is 
added.  
An alternative reason why increased intention salience and added negligence information 
might influence punishment but not acceptability judgments might lie in the different rating 
scales. Acceptability was measured on a bidirectional 5-point scale from very, very bad to very, 
very good, with okay at the centre. This might have invited neutral okay responses that required 
relatively little consideration of intention, negligence and outcome. In contrast, the punishment 
scale was unidirectional, from no trouble to lots of trouble. Since there was no neutral 
response, participants might have had to make more considered judgments, in which case the 
increased salience of intention and the addition of negligence information might have had more 
impact. This possibility could be tested by measuring response latencies (Imamoğlu, 1975), or 
by removing okay in the acceptability scale so that participants were forced to make either 
positive or negative judgments.  
A limitation of this study is that there were sampling differences within and between 
experiments. In particular, children from different schools were interviewed, and it is likely 
that this accounted for some of the variance in judgments reported here. For example, many of 
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the young children in Experiment 2 attended small infant schools in relatively well-off villages, 
while the 7-8 year-olds were at larger junior schools, one of which was in a less affluent urban 
area. These differences might account for the relatively poor comprehension of the 7-8-year-
olds, which could have impacted their moral judgments. In addition, testing conditions differed 
between schools, not least in terms of background noise, which is likely to have affected some 
children’s concentration. Buon, Jacob, Loissel and Dupoux (2013) report that even adults’ 
moral judgments become outcome-based under cognitive load, and the noise and distractions 
of everyday school life might have a similar effect on children.  
Another limitation is that, while participants were asked about intentions after their 
judgments, they were not asked about outcomes. It is possible that these were sometimes 
forgotten or misunderstood, too. As Feldman et al. (1976) point out, “Without memory checks, 
it is not possible to assess what information the subject was in fact using when the judgment 
was made. Thus, preference for intent- or consequence-based judgments without recall data 
does not necessarily reflect the subjects' awareness of the information.” (p. 559). Future 
researchers are encouraged to include confirmation questions about intention and outcome both 
before and after judgments, or to ask respondents to retell the story (Nelson, 1980).  
Although the advantages of replications have been stressed, this study also illustrates 
some disadvantages. In particular, since it was important to replicate Helwig et al.’s and Zelazo 
et al.’s studies as closely as possible, it was not possible to simplify their stories to aid young 
children’s comprehension. For example, the agents in the Helwig et al. stories gave the wrong 
animals as presents because they had false beliefs about the contents of the gift boxes. In effect, 
then, these stories included a “deceptive box” theory of mind task. Since large proportions of 
4-year-olds fail such tasks (Perner, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman & Liu, 2004) it is 
likely that many young children in this study were confused about the agents’ intentions, in 
which case their apparently outcome-based judgments would actually have been based on 
misunderstood intentions.  
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A further limitation was revealed by the high proportions of younger children who, 
despite the increased salience and recency of intention information, continued to misunderstand 
or forget the agents’ intentions. For these participants, then, this manipulation appears to have 
lacked effectiveness. Given the efficacy of similar changes in previous research (e.g., Bearison 
& Isaacs, 1975; Feldman et al., 1976; Nelson et al., 1980; Nummedal & Bass, 1976), this is 
surprising, and suggests that failure to understand or recall occurred even more frequently in 
the large majority of previous research because outcomes are usually more salient and recent 
than intentions. However, Gvozdic et al. (2016) propose that much of children’s outcome-
based judgment occurs because of the related issue of failure to inhibit automatic responses to 
outcomes. This would explain the effectiveness of their metacognitive training approach 
relative to ours, and suggests that instructing children to “not focus too much” on consequences 
would have resulted in higher levels of intention-based judgment by children.  
Much the same point applies to the addition of negligence information in Experiment 2, 
since many young children and even some adults continued to consider the agents to be 
careless. A similar approach to that used here (i.e., telling participants that, and how, agents 
were careful) was shown to be effective by Nobes et al. (2009), but the present findings 
indicate that some participants’ persisting assumptions of negligence might have continued to 
result in apparent outcome-based judgments both in that study and here.  
Our finding that 4-5 year-olds often misunderstood the stories led to our decision not to 
include even younger children. Had we used different stories that did not cause these problems, 
we would have included 3-year-olds. If they were found to judge primarily according to 
outcome, this would have provided support for an outcome-to-intent shift, albeit considerably 
earlier than any researchers (to our knowledge) have proposed. Replications of other studies 
that used less challenging stories are required to investigate this possibility.  
Another issue for future research is to determine why the parental knowledge question 
resulted in so many participants effectively changing from outcome-based judgments to 
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intention-based responses. This might be done by telling participants before they judged that 
potential punishers understood agents’ intentions. If this resulted in more intention-based 
judgment, then this would indicate the extent to which apparently outcome-based judgments in 
this and other studies were based on the assumption that punishers could not have known the 
agents’ true intentions.  
While our findings indicate that even young children’s judgments are primarily intention-
based, it is also clear that there are some wide disparities between the judgments of children of 
the same age: a small number persisted in making outcome-based judgments even in 
Experiment 2. The reasons for these intriguing individual differences have received very little 
attention from researchers, and remain poorly understood. It is possible that such children are 
severely disadvantaged in their social interactions because they fail to understand others’ 
intentions, or are unaware of the significance of intentions when evaluating their own and 
others’ actions. Indeed, an important precursor of aggressive behavior is hostile attribution 
bias, that is, the tendency to misattribute hostility to others’ benign intentions (Arsenio, Adams, 
& Gold, 2009; Crick & Dodge, 1994). Future research should investigate the potential for 
measures of intention-based judgment – such as those used here and in similar studies – to 
identify individuals who are at risk for these misattributions and the antisocial behavior that 
results. These measures might also be adapted to develop interventions aimed at preventing or 
mitigating these misattributions, and hence reducing aggressive behavior. 
In summary, the findings of these experiments indicate that, despite using very similar 
methods to Helwig et al. (2001) and Zelazo et al. (1996) – both of which reported primarily 
outcome-based moral judgment at all ages – participants’ acceptability and punishment 
judgments were primarily intention-based. They therefore corroborate those of Nobes et al. 
(2016) and extend them in several ways: in particular, they indicate that even 4-5 year-olds’ 
judgments are primarily intention-based, and that by 5-6 years children’s punishment 
judgments are as intention-based as are adults’. The evidence presented here also indicates that, 
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in addition to Nobes et al.’s finding that high proportions of outcome-based judgments resulted 
from the wording of the acceptability question, some outcome-based punishment (but not 
acceptability) judgments in the original studies resulted from intention information being 
insufficiently salient, and from participants sometimes assuming that negative outcomes were 
caused by negligence. These findings shed light on the reasons for apparently outcome-based 
judgment not only in Helwig et al. and Zelazo et al., but also in the large majority of other 
studies in this area because they, too, gave no information about negligence, and included 
outcomes that were more salient than intentions. 
These findings are inconsistent with the strong form of the outcome-to-intention shift 
espoused originally by Piaget (1932 / 1965) and subsequently corroborated by most researchers 
in this area, according to which young children’s moral judgments are primarily outcome-
based. However, even in Experiment 2 a large minority of the youngest children’s judgments 
remained outcome-based, as did some older children’s acceptability judgments. Neither 
intention salience nor negligence information either independently or in combination can 
account for this persisting outcome-based judgment. Moreover, these factors do not explain the 
differences between age-groups, since young children’s judgements were influenced no more 
(nor less) than other age-groups by either. The findings are therefore consistent with the weak 
form of the outcome-to-intent shift, according to which, while not being primarily outcome-
based, children’s judgments are more outcome-based than are adults’.  
But the findings presented here suggest other possible reasons for outcome-based 
judgments. In particular, they reveal a high level of misunderstanding by children of the key 
elements of the stories, perhaps because they forgot, or failed to integrate information about 
intentions, negligence and outcomes. Their apparently outcome-based judgments could 
therefore actually have been based on incorrect beliefs about the agents’ intentions or level of 
negligence. In addition, when asked the parental knowledge question, most participants at all 
ages who made outcome-based judgments gave intention-based responses, which shows that 
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almost all children are at least sensitive to intention information, and are capable of basing their 
moral judgments on it. These, and perhaps other possible reasons for their higher rates of 
outcome-based judgments must be tested before we can be sure about the extent to which 
children’s judgments are actually based on intention and outcome. 
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Table 1  
Percentages of correct predictions, confirmations and justifications (Experiment 1). Example questions in parentheses. 
 4-5 years 5-6 years 7-8 years Adults 
Predictions     
 Behavior (“What is Kevin going to get Rob?”) 88.9 91.7 96.3 100 
 Emotion (“How did Rob feel when he got the puppy?”) 94.9 97.8 100 100 
Confirmations     
 Outcome (“Did Kevin give Rob a puppy or a spider?”) 82.0 86.1 100 100 
 Cause (“Why did Kevin give Rob a puppy?”) 91.0 94.4 100 100 
 Intention (“What did Kevin try to get Rob?”) 88.0 100 100 100 
Intention post-judgment (“What did Kevin want to do to Rob?”)* 75.6 89.7 95.7 100 
Justification** 86.0 94.4 98.8 100 
 
* Post-judgment intention questions were asked only when judgments were outcome-based. 
** A correct justification is factually correct, regardless of whether it is based on intention, outcome, etc. 
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Table 2 
Percentages of punishment justifications based on intention, negligence and outcome, by age-group (Experiment 1) 
Justification basis  4-5 years 5-6 years 7-8 years Adults Total 
Intention  40.7 57.7 64.9 86.8 62.5 
Negligence  0 0 0 4.2 1.0 
Outcome  29.6 25.9 24.3 6.8 21.7 
Other / DK  29.7 16.4 10.9 2.3 14.8 
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Table 3  
Frequencies of outcome-based punishment judgments, and frequencies of intention-based responses to the subsequent parental knowledge 
question, by age-group in Experiment 1. (The parental knowledge question was asked only when the punishment judgments were outcome-based.) 
  4-5 years 5-6 years 7-8 years Adults Total 
Outcome-based punishment judgments  38 26 21 5 90 
Intention-based parental knowledge response  26 17 17 4 64 
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Table 4  
Percentages of correct predictions, confirmations and justifications (Experiment 2) 
 4-5 years 5-6 years 7-8 years Adults 
Predictions     
 Behavior  84.9 98.1 94.9 100 
 Emotion  96.0 98.3 97.5 100 
Confirmations     
 Care 60.8 67.0 71.8 89.9 
 Outcome 84.6 96.4 91.3 100 
 Cause 92.3 98.0 98.8 100 
 Intention  96.0 98.0 97.5 100 
Justification* 87.1 90.0 98.7 100 
 
* A correct justification is factually correct, regardless of whether it is based on intention, outcome, etc. 
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Table 5 
Percentages of punishment justifications based on intention, negligence and outcome, by age-group and action valence (Experiment 2) 
Justification basis  4-5 years 5-6 years 7-8 years Adults Total 
Intention  32.7 54.1 78.4 83.7 62.2 
Negligence  0.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Outcome  20.8 12.1 15.7 10.9 14.9 
Other  45.8 30.7 6.0 5.4 22.0 
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Table 6 
Frequencies of outcome-based punishment judgments, and of intention-based responses to the subsequent parental knowledge question, by age-
group and action valence in Experiment 2. (The parental knowledge question was asked only when the punishment judgments were outcome-
based.) 
  4-5 years 5-6 years 7-8 years Adults Total 
Outcome-based punishment judgments  38 20 18 9 85 
Intention-based ‘parental knowledge’ response  26 16 15 8 65 
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Figure 1. Mean (+SE) acceptability ratings (1 = really, really bad; 5 = really, really good) of accidental and attempted harms by age group when 
intention salience and recency are increased (Experiment 1).  
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Figure 2. Mean (+SE) punishment ratings (0 = none; 2 = a lot) of accidental and attempted harms by age group when intention salience and 
recency are increased (Experiment 1). 
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Figure 3. Mean (+SE) acceptability (1 = really, really bad; 5 = really, really good) ratings of accidental and attempted harms by age-group when 
intention salience is increased and carefulness information added (Experiment 2).  
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Figure 4. Mean (+SE) punishment (0 = none; 2 = a lot) ratings of accidental and attempted harms by age-group when intention salience is 
increased and carefulness information added (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 5. Mean (+SE) differences in acceptability judgments of accidental harms and attempted harms by age group and experiment. Positive 
scores indicate that accidental harms are considered more acceptable than attempted harms; higher scores indicate more intention-based judgment. 
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Figure 6. Mean (+SE) differences in punishment judgments of accidental harms and attempted harms by age group and experiment. Positive 
scores indicate that accidental harms are considered less punishable than attempted harms; higher scores indicate more intention-based judgment. 
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Appendix: Example interview schedules 
1. Accidental harm (positive intention; negative outcome), adapted from Helwig et al. (2001) 
Issue / question Nobes et al. (2016) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Preference: Puppies Here’s Ethan. Ethan has a friend named Chris. Chris really likes puppies.  He likes to read about them and play 
with them. When Chris sees puppies, he feels happy because he likes them.   
Comprehension 1: Puppies How does Chris feel when he 
sees puppies? 
 
Preference: Spiders Chris doesn’t like spiders though. When Chris sees big spiders, he is afraid. Big spiders scare Chris. When Chris 
sees big spiders he is afraid and he cries.  
Comprehension 2: Spiders How does Chris feel when he 
sees big spiders? 
 
Intention When Chris invited Ethan to his birthday party, Ethan wanted to bring a present that would make Chris happy. 
Confirmation 1: Spiders Now, how does Chris feel 
when he sees big spiders?  
 
Confirmation 2: Puppies How does he feel when he 
sees puppies? 
 
Knowledge Now, Ethan knows that Chris likes puppies. He knows that Chris is scared and cries when he sees big spiders 
and is happy and smiles when he sees puppies. 
Behavioral prediction What is Ethan going to get Chris for his birthday? Is he going to get Chris a puppy or a spider? 
Intention Well, let me tell you what happened. Ethan wanted to make Chris happy and he knew Chris liked puppies, so 
Ethan decided to get Chris a puppy for his birthday.  
Care  Ethan went to the pet shop and asked 
for a puppy. Ethan was very careful to 
make sure that he got Chris a puppy. 
He couldn’t look in the box because it 
was very well wrapped up, and so he 
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asked the man in the shop if he was 
sure there was a puppy in the box. The 
man said “Don’t worry, there’s a 
puppy in the box”. 
Cause But someone at the pet shop made a mistake and put a big spider in the 
box instead. 
But actually the man in the pet shop 
made a mistake and put a big spider in 
the box instead.  
Outcome - act So Ethan gave Chris a big spider for his birthday. 
Emotional state 
prediction 
How do you think Chris felt when he got the big spider? 
Outcome - emotion When Chris got the big spider he was upset. Chris was scared by the spider. 
Confirmation 3: Care  Was Ethan careful to make sure he 
gave Chris a puppy and not a spider? 
Confirmation 4: Outcome  Did Ethan give Chris a puppy or a spider? 
Confirmation 5: Cause 
(deliberate / accidental) 
 Why did Ethan give Chris a spider? Did he want to give him the spider, or did 
he give it to him by mistake? 
Confirmation 6: Intention  What did Ethan try to get Chris? Did he try to get him a puppy or a spider? 
Acceptability Is Ethan good, bad or just OK? How good/bad? Is he really, really good/bad or just a little good/bad or just 
okay? 
Punishment Should Ethan get in trouble?  A little trouble or a lot of trouble? 
Justification Why should/n’t he get in trouble?  
Confirmation 7: Intention  [If should get in trouble:] What did Ethan want to do to Chris? Did he want to 
make Chris feel happy or scared? 
Parental knowledge [If should get in trouble:] If his parents found out he tried to give Chris a puppy, should they tell him off? Why? 
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2. Attempted harm (negative intention; positive outcome), adapted from Zelazo et al. (1996) 
Issue / question Nobes et al. (2016) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Introduction Here's Anne.  Anne’s parents went on a trip to Brazil, far, far away. You know what they found there? They 
found a special kind of animal called a dax and they brought it back to Anne.   
Preference: Stroking Now, a dax is pretty normal, it has skin just like you and me. When you stroke a dax, it feels good and it smiles 
Comprehension 1: 
Stroking 
What does a dax do when you 
stroke it?   
 
Preference: Hitting It doesn't like to be hit, though.  That really, really hurts a dax, when you hit it.  When you hit it, it hurts and it 
cries.   
Comprehension 2: 
Hitting 
What does a dax do when you 
hit it?   
 
Intention When Anne’s parents gave her the dax she wanted to hurt it.   
Confirmation 1: Stroking Now, what does a dax do 
when you stroke it?   
 
Confirmation 2: Hitting And what does it do when 
you hit it?   
 
Knowledge Now, Anne knows that a dax is normal. She knows that it cries when you hit it and that it smiles when you stroke 
it.   
Behavioral prediction What is Anne going to do?   
Knowledge That's right.  Anne wanted to make the dax sad and she knew it didn't like to be hit, so 
Care  she held it very carefully to make sure 
it couldn’t get away, and 
Intention she tried to hit it.   
Cause But, you know what? When she tried to hit it, the dax wiggled away 
Outcome - act so she ended up stroking it by mistake  
Outcome - emotion and the dax smiled. 
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Confirmation 3: 
Care 
 Did Anne hold the dax carefully to 
make sure it couldn’t get away? 
Confirmation 4: 
Outcome 
 Did Anne hit the dax or stroke it? 
Confirmation 5: Cause 
(deliberate / accidental) 
 Why did Anne stroke the dax? Did she want to stroke the dax, or did she stroke it 
by mistake? 
Confirmation 6: Intention  What did Anne try to do? Did she try to stroke the dax, or did she try to hit it? 
Acceptability Is Anne good, bad or just okay? How bad/good? Is she really, really bad/good or just a little bad/good/ or just 
okay? 
Punishment Should Anne get in trouble?  A little trouble or a lot of trouble? 
Justification Why should/n’t she get in trouble?  
Confirmation 7: Intention  [If shouldn’t get in trouble:] What did Anne want to do to the dax? Did she want 
to make it feel nice or did she want to hurt it? 
Parental knowledge [If shouldn’t get in trouble:] If her parents found out she tried to hit the dax, should they tell her off? Why? 
 
 
 
